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Abstract—Ubiquitous devices comprising several resource-
constrained nodes with sensors, actuators and networking capa-
bilities, are becoming part of many solutions that seek to enhance
user’s environment smartness and quality of living, prominently
including enhanced healthcare services. In such an environment,
security issues are of primary concern as a potential resource
misuse can severely impact user’s privacy or even become life
threatening. Access to these resources should be appropriately
controlled to ensure that eHealth nodes are adequately protected
and the services are available to authorized entities. The intrinsic
resource limitations of these nodes, however, make satisfying these
requirements a great challenge. This paper proposes and analyzes
a service oriented architecture that provides a policy-based,
unified, cross-platform and flexible access control mechanism,
allowing authorized entities to consume services provided by
eHealth nodes while protecting their valuable resources. The
scheme is XACML-driven although modifications to the related
standardised architecture are proposed to satisfy the require-
ments imposed by limitations in the computational environment.
A proof of concept implementation is presented, along with the
associated performance evaluation, confirming the feasibility of
the proposed approach.
Index Terms—healthcare, authentication, authorization, body
sensor networks, policy-based access control, XACML, DPWS,
web services, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have experienced a lot of innovation in
the Internet of Things (IoT) space. Collections of embedded
and wearable nodes, typically bearing sensors and actuators,
are becoming part of a networking infrastructure and gain
connectivity to the Internet. The corresponding technologies
are becoming mature enough to allow us to start looking into
more advanced and comprehensive solutions that can enable
these nodes to integrate smoothly with existing infrastructures,
expanding, however, existing attack surfaces.
There are many application areas where these nodes flourish
ith even more being introduced to take advantage of the
services that they can offer. Healthcare stands out as a key
sector where these novel technologies and associated enhanced
services can have a significant impact by improving the quality
of life of patients, elderly people, but also the general pop-
ulation through real-time monitoring and intervention which
enables proactive and more effective health management,
justifying the intensive research efforts in the field [1], [2],
[3].
These sophisticated nodes can be deployed as standalone
devices serving a single purpose, or as part of an infrastructure
that consists of nodes with similar characteristics comprising
a so called low power and lossy network (LLN). Moreover,
they can be used simply for monitoring various variables or
for acting upon command issuance, be part of a closed system
or provide advanced services to remote parties over public
networks. The current trend for all these nodes is to adopt
existing networking technologies and be reachable over the
Internet, abandoning proprietary closed solutions. Moreover,
existing networking mechanisms are updated and adapted
to efficiently handle the vast population of the resource-
constrained devices. Such examples are IETFs work on the
6LoWPAN [4] standards to enable IPv6 connectivity over
IEEE 802.15.4 networks and research on improving the as-
sociated MAC protocols [5], [6], [7].
At the higher layers, sensor nodes and Service Oriented
Architectures (SOAs) have become convergent technologies
with several standards emerging from these efforts. SOAs
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evolved from the need to have interoperable, cross-platform,
cross-domain and network-agnostic access to devices and their
services. This approach has already been successful in business
environments, as web services allow stakeholders to focus on
the services themselves, rather than the underlying hardware
and network technologies. When deploying a SOA there are
quite a few effective options to provide these services, but the
Devices Profile for Web Services [8] specification stands out
as it enables the adoption of a SOA approach on embedded and
sensor devices with limited resources, allowing system owners
to leverage the SOA benefits across heterogeneous systems
that may be found in smart environments.
Whatever the deployment option and the mechanisms
adopted, all these nodes are characterized by their limited
resources in terms of computing power, memory, storage
space, bandwidth and energy. These characteristics expose
target devices to a variety of security issues [9], such as
trivial attacks aiming for rapid resource exhaustion leading
to Denial of Service (DoS). At the same time, studies [10]
and published reports [11] reveal that current deployments
have not adequately considered the threats that these nodes
face when connected to the Internet, hence the lack of
the security measures. The Open Web Application Security
Project (OWASP) organization includes “Insufficient Authen-
tication/Authorization” in the second place of its list of top
ten security problems identified on IoT devices [12], preceded
only by the use of “Insecure Web Interfaces”. Such negligence
is bound to inhibit any efforts made towards using these
pervasive devices to handle our personal sensitive data. The
expanded attack surface that results from the integration of
LLNs with the Internet, needs new or adapted mechanisms to
mitigate these new threats.
In the context of healthcare applications, the above security
issues are exacerbated by the direct interaction with the
human body and the associated safety and privacy concerns.
In typical nodes used for eHealth purposes, environmental
and physiological sensors are deployed for gathering all the
required information depending on medical staffs prescribed
needs, such as blood pressure and body and room temperature.
On top of that, actuators controlled by authorized medical staff
can also be deployed, such as an automatic insulin injection
device used for remote treatment. Such sensitive actions, i.e.
reading and issuing commands, need strict access control
decisions before being authorized so that users privacy and
even safety are not jeopardized by unauthorized actions.
Motivated from the above, this work proposes an architec-
ture that allows authorized entities to access the services pro-
vided by resource-limited eHealth nodes. The scheme provides
flexibility in terms of the authentication mechanism used, that
is to say that the service requester can be authenticated using
e.g. username/password, certificate, or other authentication
methods. Among the main concerns of the proposed architec-
ture are the nodes’ protection from unjustifiable use of their
resources and the need to be able to control access through
a well-established set of policy rules that can change and
adapt to new environmental parameters. The work builds upon
the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
[13] model for policy based access control infrastructures,
proposing certain modifications to satisfy requirements stem-
ming from the limited resources of nodes, and the adoption of
lightweight SOA mechanisms, through the use of the DPWS,
for entity interactions. Such a limited resources device is an
eHealth node that a user possesses and can provide useful
healthcare services to medical staff and other stakeholders.
Although mainly a framework, the main components of the
proposed architecture have been implemented by the authors,
and results are provided here as a proof of concept.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
technical background and relevant research efforts identified
in the literature. Section III includes specific use cases to
highlight the rationale behind this work, while Section IV
lists the essential requirements identified during the design
phase. Section V presents the proposed architecture in detail,
while sections VI and VII detail the approach followed to
implement the framework’s entities and their performance
evaluation respectively. A discussion on the security issues that
must be considered to safeguard the framework’s operation
can be found in Section VIII. Finally, Section IX features
concluding remarks and pointers to future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
On the communication level, all efforts are towards the
integration of low power and lossy networks (LLNs) with
existing networking technologies to provide internet connec-
tivity and realize the so called Internet of Things. Several
solutions have emerged through this process with their partic-
ular advantages, disadvantages and properties. Most of them
have provided their own standards and specifications and have
helped formulate antagonistic technologies. They might differ
on various layers of the TCP/IP stack, such as the physical and
the network layer or on the upper layers, i.e. presentation and
application layers. Regarding the former we have technologies
like open standards 6LoWPAN and ZigBee (which is free
for non-commercial purposes), proprietary provided under a
license like Z-Wave, and alternatives like Bluetooth and Wifi
usually met in other environments. It is not in the scope
of this paper to name all these technologies and provide a
comparative analysis. The proposed solution focuses on the
architecture level and on the upper layers of the TCP/IP stack,
thus making this solution underlying protocol independent.
6LoWPAN seems to outweigh other technologies given its
Internet connectivity orientation which provides many benefits
to adopting solutions.
On upper layers of the TCP/IP stack, protocols provide
methods to exchange structured or unstructured messages that
facilitate (secure) service access. Data are typically encapsu-
lated in standardised protocols that allow the seamless ex-
change of messages between nodes and remote entities, outside
the LLN boundaries, even if this is accomplished through the
use of a bridge and/or router. Among the technologies being
used are the service-oriented ones with several schemes being
used for the way these services are provided and how a ser-
vice consumer can access them. Standardisation and research
efforts in the area of Service Oriented Architectures have
been taking place for more than a decade and schemes have
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been proposed and standardised regarding service discovery,
registration, access and protection, and the corresponding com-
munication protocols that enable the interoperable exchange
of messages among remote participating entities. While in
some cases efforts focus on adapting existing technologies
to the constrained environment provided by such devices,
other initiatives target for the introduction of new mechanisms
specifically designed for such environments, without however
neglecting interoperability with existing Internet technologies.
Such a scheme is the Devices Profile for Web Services
(DPWS) [8], a profile of Web Services protocols that enables
Web Service messaging, discovery, description, and eventing
on resource-constrained devices. DPWS messages are typi-
cally encapsulated in SOAP (Simple Object Access Proto-
col) envelopes and transported over any transport protocol,
including HTTP and UDP using the SOAP-over-HTTP and
SOAP-over-UDP bindings respectively [14], or even an SMTP
binding.
Another option is the use or a RESTful environment based
on Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [15]. Both SOAP
and REST are protocols used to access Web services but
they are based on completely different technologies. SOAP
is an XML-based standardised protocol which, although has
been criticized for its complexity stemming mainly from the
inherent structured information exchange, it has more power
and enjoys extensibility. REST is the lighter and more flexible
alternative where one can get the necessary information even
by using the URL approach.
Among the above solutions, the authors chose to adopt the
DPWS specification, which can enable user-to-machine and
machine-to-machine interactions in a unified manner, moving
on from the current state of the field, where manufacturers
offer a variety of proprietary protocols which are not inter-
operable and essentially lock-in users, forcing them to use a
specific vendor/ecosystem.
In terms of the way that access to these services is
controlled, the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [13], provides an access control language and a
model for processing requests to resources while the Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) focuses on the way the
requester is authenticated and assertions are being transferred
among participating entities. WS-Trust is another web services
oriented model that defines how security tokens are being
issued, renewed and validated (WS-Trust).
Many access control schemes have been proposed for wire-
less sensor networks, yet most of them focus on authentication
and authorization schemes and on enhancing basic access
control models to address privacy matters. Such schemes
can be found in [16], [17], [18], [19]. Little work has been
carried out on policy-based access control (PBAC). The EU-
funded research project Internet-of-Things Architecture (IoT-
A) worked on the adoption of XACML in the Internet of
Things [20] and proposed a generic model whose functional
modules are mapped to a set of well-defined components that
comprise the IoT-A. The authors use a logistics scenario for
demonstration purposes.
In [21] the authors also utilize XACML but focus on the
privacy of eHealth data within the mobile environment. In con-
trast to the work presented here, a complete framework is not
included and, moreover, the authors choose computationally
intensive security mechanisms such as XML encryption digital
signatures. In [22], the authors propose a lightweight policy
system for body sensors but they do so by presenting a custom
API and policy definitions, thus sacrificing interoperability
with existing standards and infrastructures.
Santos-Pereira et al [23] focus on enforceable security poli-
cies for systems interoperability and data exchange between
healthcare entities. The authors present a Role-based Access
Control mobile agent model, using public key infrastructure
for authentication and access control, but the proposed scheme
is presented at design-level, lacking implementation details
and a performance evaluation.
This paper focuses more on the area of securing access to
heterogeneous resources through policy-based access control,
hence it utilises the SOA-based and XACML-related stan-
dards, while proposing certain modifications, detailed below,
to better fit to the restricted environment of LLNs. This ap-
proach allows leveraging work already carried out on XACML
policy definitions, but also Web Services as mentioned above.
With regard to the former, the “Cross-Enterprise Security
and Privacy Authorization Profile of XACML v2.0 for Health-
care” [24] constitutes important background work, compatible
and in-line with the scheme proposed in this paper. This
OASIS profile specifies the use of XACML to promote in-
teroperability within the healthcare community by providing
common semantics and vocabularies for interoperable policy
request/response, policy lifecycle, and policy enforcement.
The benefits of adopting a SOA-based approach come in
the form of increased usability and interoperability. While
typical XACML deployments require the setup of complex
infrastructures to enable entities’ interaction and policy re-
trieval (e.g. via the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol,
LDAP [25]), the proposed framework leverages the benefits of
DPWS. This allows the deployment of devices aligned with the
Web Services technologies, thus facilitating interoperability
among services provided by resource-constrained devices,
facilitating seamless discovery and interactions among entities,
and allowing the deployment of the framework’s entities to
any platform, anywhere on the hospital or home network, with
minimal involvement on behalf of the user.
III. APPLICABLE SCENARIO
Before moving into the presentation of the proposed ar-
chitecture, it would be good to demonstrate through specific
scenarios, the incentives behind this work that have also for-
mulated the requirements defined below. The proposed scheme
addresses the main need to be able to remotely access data
collected by sensors and control actuators deployed in a LLN.
The architecture utilizes service oriented technology to be able
to provide services to remote authorized parties where access
restrictions are imposed through policy rules. This typically
means that access is not necessarily restricted to entities of a
closed system. Such an architecture fits perfectly to a Body
Sensor Network (BSN) deployment [26], [27], which actually
inspired this work, and which we use here to demonstrate
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the architecture’s applicability and the way that policy based
access control SOAs are envisaged.
Let’s assume that a patient has multiple medical sensors
and/or actuators deployed to monitor and/or control his/her
medical condition. Sensors and actuators typically reside on
nodes with very limited processing power and capabilities,
namely nano nodes. These can communicate and register with
a mobile device that the user has in possession, such as a
mobile phone or tablet. An application running on this mobile
device actively monitors sensor’s readings and, if necessary
or appropriately instructed, forwards these data to authorized
medical staff. Alternatively, the data could be given to medical
staff not as a result of an alert, but as a response to a request
issued by this staff.
Now consider the case where in the context of telemedicine
or in case of an accident as well as for many other medical
reasons, other people not previously registered with the user’s
application, need to gain access to those readings and actua-
tors. For example, a patient is involved in an accident, which
is reported to the emergency services, and some readings have
to be taken to validate his medical conditions while emergency
services are on their way to the accident scene.
In this case, the requester, i.e. doctor, emergency services
staff, will request remote access to the readings of these
sensors or even issue commands to the actuators. Without loss
of generality, we can claim that in the eHealth environment,
as with any other environments, services might need to be
accessed occasionally, depending on the patient’s health condi-
tion, and on a need to know basis. Therefore, several questions
arise that have to be addressed in the proposed architecture,
mostly related to patient’s privacy and life protection.
• Who is eligible to access this information?
• How do we authenticate a user that has not been regis-
tered with the specific service in the past?
• How is the legitimacy of his/her request evaluated?
• Who and how is going to decide about this requester’s
privileges?
In our scenario we consider that the medical staff can look
in a central repository for the types of services provided by the
patient and can request access to them. This is checked against
applicable policies that the user in conjunction with medical
staff and/or national insurance and/or insurance company
and/or applicable law have defined. If access is granted the
request is forwarded to the patient’s device and the requested
information is disclosed or access to the actuator is permitted.
As a result, the requester will be able to have sensor readings,
e.g. patient’s heart rate, and/or act remotely, e.g. inject an
altered dose of insulin.
IV. REQUIREMENTS
Access control is very important for protecting the sensitive
resources of a BSN, which can affect human lives. Among the
requirements that have to be satisfied are the following [28],
[29]:
• Data confidentiality: Access to medical data should only
be allowed to authorized parties, such as medical staff.
Note that unauthorized disclosure of medical data while
in transit is also a protection requirement.
• Message authentication: Commands issued to actuators
must be authenticated to avoid unauthorized execution.
• Availability: Data must remain available to authorized
entities, such as medical staff, while access to them must
not be denied due to wrong decisions.
IP based networking in LLNs changes the way that partici-
pating nodes can be accessed and their respective services can
be consumed. For instance, there is no need for a dedicated
application server that will intervene between a node and a
remote party that wants to access the node’s resources [30].
However, one of the problems that these nodes face in such a
deployment, is that they have limited resources which do not
suffice for the deployment of strong protection mechanisms.
Without those mechanisms however, nodes are exposed to
direct access from the Internet without having the capacity
to handle unlimited requests. Therefore, several issues arise
regarding the protection of nodes resources, that have to be
addressed. The main aim is to protect the limited resources
of a node that implements a service oriented architecture, to
provide access to data and mechanisms that the node has under
control.
Within this context, the proposed architecture is designed
to satisfy the following requirements:
• Provide services using of Service Oriented Architecture
technologies;
• Provide fine-grained access control to nodes’ resources;
• Authenticate remote entities wishing to access protected
nodes resources;
• Control access to nodes’ resources through well-defined
policies;
• Protect sensitive nodes from unauthorised access and
unnecessary consumption of valuable resources including
network and energy;
• Secure the channel between the participating nodes to
provide message confidentiality, integrity and authentica-
tion;
• Comply with existing standards to satisfy interoperability
among the participating entities, such as between the
identity provider chosen by the requester and the service
orchestrator, regarding the exchange of authentication
messages, assertions or user metadata and attributes.
In the following section we describe the proposed architec-
ture that satisfies the above.
V. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
The architecture proposed in this paper is an enhanced
policy based access control scheme that seeks to provide
flexibility regarding the chosen authentication mechanism
while satisfying the aforementioned requirements, typically
imposed by nodes’ resource limitations. For this purpose,
certain modifications to the OASIS standardised policy-based
access control scheme are proposed to accommodate these
needs.
The scheme utilizes and seeks compliance with the follow-
ing technologies:
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• XACML: an XML-based OASIS standard that defines a
policy and an access control decision request/response
language. An XACML-based architecture typically con-
sists of the following main components:
– Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): Performs access
control, by making decision requests and enforcing
authorization decisions [13], [31].
– Policy Decision Point (PDP): Evaluates requests
against applicable policies and renders an authoriza-
tion decision [13].
– Policy Administration Point (PAP): Creates and man-
ages policies or policy sets [13].
– Policy Information Point (PIP): Acts as a source of
attribute values [13].
• SAML 2.0 specification to protect, transport, and request
XACML schema instances and other information needed
by an XACML implementation [32]. Note that although
SAML can be used to convey authorization decision
statements, this functionality in SAML is intentionally re-
stricted compared to the more flexible XACML solution,
hence the adoption of XACML and the use of SAML for
encapsulating XACML messages.
In the XACML data-flow model defined in the OASIS
standard the PEP, via the context handler, is consid red as the
device that orchestrates the exchange of messages among the
requester, the PDP, the Attribute Authority and the Attribute
Repository. According to the XACML specifications the PEP
is considered as “part of a remote-access gateway, part of a
Web server or part of an email user-agent, etc”. Therefore all
initial requests, valid or not, are sent to the PEP which will
act as a routing device between the requester and the back-end
key entities that examine the requests and make decision based
on policy rules and other parameters, such as the requester’s
and/or resource’s attributes.
While this model is appropriate for typical application gate-
ways, it cannot be considered as such for resource-constrained
nodes that only have the capacity to accept requests from
a limited number of clients. Beyond this threshold, valuable
node resource consumption is not acceptable as it leads to
battery drainage and service unavailability. In this context,
resource-constrained devices have to participate in the decision
making process only if absolutely necessary and only to
authorized entities to save valuable resources. As such, they
cannot assume the role of a PEP as this is defined in the
XACML standard [13].
Moreover, the flow model currently defined by XACML,
considers that the PIP has all the required attributes for the
requester, and that the PDP gets all the information from the
PIP, which might be queried twice for the required attributes,
once from the PEP and once from the PDP. Use of specific
PIP implies that services will only be provided to entities
subscribed to the specific scheme, thus narrowing down flex-
ibility. This is in contrast to a more flexible approach where
services are offered to a broader group of users, subject to
policy restrictions.
The proposed architecture is depicted in Figure 1. In this
proposal we assume that nodes bearing sensor and actuators,
expose their functionality as web services. This can either be
done through the device that the node is attached to, e.g. a
mobile device, or directly by the node, assuming that it is
powerful enough to accommodate such functionality. All these
nodes are part of a dispersed environment where there is not
necessarily a single gateway or web server to assume the role
of PEP as this is defined in the XACML standard. Besides
that, the service owner might want to register these services
with multiple servers. As a result, the PEP functionality cannot
be assigned to a gateway but it should be on the device that
exposes this functionality, i.e. the mobile device, a wearable
node etc. For a given PEP, one of these web servers is assumed
to play the role of the orchestrator as described below.
The core component of the proposed scheme is the Service
Orchestrator (SO) which acts as a proxy for certain operations,
such as relaying queries and messages exchanged among
participating entities, yet not for handling the information the
PEP exchanges with the requester.
Initially, the node, which assumes the role of a PEP, registers
its services, defines the connection point to be the SO and sets
the policy rules for its resources. This is accomplished once
during the set-up phase. Following that, the data flow of the
proposed architecture includes the following steps:
• A requester, who wants to access the service, formulates
an appropriate request based on the advertised service
rules, and sends it to the SO (step 1a). Note that this is
in contrast to the XACML specifications which opted for
sending the request directly to the PEP, introducing sig-
nificant overhead that a limited-resources device cannot
handle.
• The SO forwards the request to the PDP (step 1b) which,
based on the requested target, fetches all applicable
policies from the PAP (step 2) and informs the SO about
the needed user attributes (step 3). As a result, the SO
presents a list of approved Identity Providers (IdP) for
the requester to authenticate (step 4).
• The requester chooses the appropriate IdP and
the SO issues a (signed) authentication request
(<AuthnRequest>) together with an attribute
query (<AttributeQuery>) [32] to the chosen IdP.
Upon successful authentication (step 5) the requester
consents for the disclosure of certain attributes that the
SO requires. Note that the IdP might be an entity that
operates within the same environment as the SO. The
actual authentication method used by the IdP is outside
the scope of this paper.
• The IdP formulates a proper assertion for the necessary
attributes and sends it to the SO via the Requester (step
6a). As a result, the SO forwards the received assertion
to the PDP (Step 6b) [33].
• The forwarded assertion allows the PDP to establish a
security context by combining the supplied attributes with
the applicable policy rules which the PDP obtained from
the PAP (step 2). Note that additional policy rules, might
be obtained at this point (step 7), based on the requester’s
attributes. The typical XACML decision making process
can take place during this step.
• The access decision is sent to the SO (step 8). If the
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Fig. 1. Authenticated Access Control for LLNs
decision is to grant access, a signed or MAC-protected
ticket is forwarded to the PEP together with details about
the request (step 9). This is the first time that the node is
contacted, and is only performed by an authorized party,
hence not exposed to the outside world. If access is denied
the decision is simply forwarded to the Requester. The
Service Provider might also be informed on that based
on appropriate pre-configurations.
• Now the PEP can respond to the service request through
the SO (step 10). The SO can in turn send to the requester
the Access Decision and the response to the Access
Request. The Access Decision can be used as a token
for re-accessing the same service without undergoing the
authentication process.
The framework can trivially be expanded to cater for the
joint operation of two or more access control infrastructures
(i.e. PDPs and corresponding PIPs/PAPs). This can be used
as a means to consolidate the requirements of different stake-
holders and their active policy sets. In such a case, the SO
can query all the different PDPs and provide or deny access
based on pre-defined simple rules (e.g. only in cases where all
PDPs explicitly allow such access). So, for example, someones
request to access the patients blood sugar levels will only be
forwarded to the pertinent medical device if both the patient
and the attending doctor have authorized the specific individual
to perform such an action.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH
There are many open-source implementations of the
XACML handling and decision-making process that can be
utilized for the proposed architecture. The authors chose Suns
XACML [34] for this implementation, as it remains popular
among developers and is actually the basis of various current
open source and commercial offerings.
All of the frameworks entities are implemented and their
interfaces exposed using DPWS. This facilitates the discovery
and description of the devices involved, also offering control
and eventing mechanisms which assist in the communication
of the necessary information among the entities. Web Services
for Devices (WS4D) [35] is an open source initiative which
provides a number of toolkits for various platforms. The
authors APIs of choice is the WS4D-JMEDS (Java-based) [36]
stack as it is the most advanced and active work of the WS4D
initiative, supporting almost all of the existing DPWS features
and providing portability to a wide range of platforms.
The approach adopted to protect the messaging of the proof
of concept implementation is the use of the mechanisms
detailed in the Web Services Security Specification (WS-
Security or WSS, [37]). WS-Security is part of the WS-*
family of specifications published by OASIS, in-line with most
of the other standardised approaches adopted by the proposed
framework and the one typically used alongside DPWS. The
protocol specifies integrating security features in the header of
SOAP messages. Working in the application layer ensures the
end-to-end integrity and confidentiality of SOAP messages.
The exact implementation of the framework’s entities and
their communication interfaces depicted in Fig. 2 are detailed
below.
Service Orchestrator to Policy Decision Point: The SO is
implemented as a DPWS peer (i.e. both a client and a server).
Other than the necessary mechanisms needed to interface with
the approved identity providers (which will vary depending on
the specific scenario/deployment examined), it also features an
“Attribute Requirements” operation. Similarly, the PDP has an
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Fig. 2. DPWS-based implementation of the authentication scheme
“Access Request Operation”. The latter is invoked by the SO
as soon as an access request arrives from a service consumer,
relaying the request for evaluation. As soon as the XACML
decision-making process is completed, the PDP replies to
the invocation with its access decision. As detailed in the
information flow above, prior to providing a decision, it may
need to invoke the “Attribute Requirements” operation on the
SO, in order to inform it of the needed user attributes, getting
the proper assertion as an answer.
Service Orchestrator to Policy Enforcement Point: The
Policy Enforcement Point must reside on every device with
resources that must be protected from unauthorized access.
Other than the functional elements of the devices which the
framework intends to protect (e.g. access to its sensors), one
extra operation must be present on each DPWS device, namely
the “PEP Operation”. The SO, acting as a client, invokes
this operation providing the service consumers access request
along with the decision (pre-issued by the PDP) as input. If
the decision accompanying the invocation is positive, the PEP
replies to the SO with the resource (e.g. temperature reading)
that the service consumer originally tried to access. This infor-
mation is then relayed to the service consumer/requester. The
above DPWS-based communication mechanisms are depicted
Fig. 2.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The platform-agnostic nature of SOAs enables the proposed
framework to be deployed, by design, on a variety of platforms
and operating systems. However, in order to realistically assess
the performance of the proposed framework, the developed
entities had to be deployed on devices expected to be present
in healthcare deployments. Therefore, the proposed frame-
work was implemented and its performance was evaluated
on a heterogeneous environment, featuring relatively resource-
constrained embedded platforms as well as desktop computers.
The PEP-equipped target device (i.e. the device providing
the actual service to be accessed) was on a Beaglebone
[38], a low-cost credit-card-sized embedded device that runs
a compact Linux-based operating system. It uses an ARM
Cortex-A8 single core CPU running at 720MHz (throttled at
500MHz during testing) with 256MB DDR2 RAM. The test-
bed for the Service Orchestrator was a similar but slightly
more powerful and versatile Beagleboard-xM [39] embedded
platform, featuring an 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8 processor (throt-
tled to run at 600MHz during testing) and 512MB DDR2
RAM, also running a minimal Linux-based operating system.
The access control infrastructure entities, i.e. the PDP and
PIP/PAP, were deployed on a desktop system (Core i5 CPU
at 3.3GHz, 8GB DDR3 RAM). An identical desktop system
was used to run the service consumer, a client application
programmed to automatically invoke the resources exposed by
the SO and record response times, for benchmarking purposes.
Tests also included a second scenario where an extra PDP
and PIP/PAP were deployed on a more resource-constrained
platform, namely a Beaglebone embedded device, like the one
used for the target device (i.e. the PEP). The latter was used
to investigate the performance impact when the SO has to
query two different PDPs, each with its own policy set, to
emulate the use case where e.g. the patient and the hospital
each have their own access control infrastructure and policy
requirements. In this scenario, the SO had to evaluate both
responses and only allow the user to access the resources if
both PDPs allowed such access.
The test setup described above is depicted in Fig. 3. Note
that this setup is by no means the only option for the proposed
framework’s deployment. For instance, a Beaglebone was
chosen for the SO to simply demonstrate the ability of the
SO to be deployed even in a constrained environment of an
embedded system. In a large-scale deployment one would
expect the functionality of the SO to be deployed at an
application server to ensure the system is able to serve a
sufficient number of users.
Aiming to also assess the performance impact in situations
where the messages exchanged would have to be secured,
an alternative proof-of-concept implementation was developed
adopting the security mechanisms specified in WS-Security.
These mechanisms safeguard the integrity and confidentiality
of the policy messaging exchanged by the frameworks entities.
The application profiling (i.e. CPU and memory utilization)
was focused on the Service Orchestrator, which is the main
entity of the proposed approach, and on devices which are
expected to have resource limitations, i.e. the PEP-equipped
target device. Moreover, the impact on user experience was
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Fig. 3. The test-bed setup, featuring embedded devices and desktop PCs. Orange lines indicate communication where WS-Security is optionally enabled.
Also depicts the extra PDP & PIP/PAP introduced in the second test scenario.
also assessed, by recording client-side response times in all
usage scenarios.
The steps related to the Identity Provider were omitted
during testing, as these will vary depending on the Identity
Provider that the user will choose and are deployment-specific,
thus out of the scope of the framework presented in this work.
A total of 100 consecutive requests were issued from
the service consumer application to the SO residing on the
Beagleboard-xM. The response time recorded by the test
client trying to access the target devices resources appear in
Fig. 4. The WS-Security mechanisms impose a significant
overhead to the response times, which is expected given the
use of asymmetric cryptographic mechanisms. In contrast,
the response times for the second scenario indicate that the
introduction of a second instance of the PDP and PIP/PAP
is not prohibitive, while allowing to consolidate the policy
requirements of different stakeholders.
Fig. 5. Service Orchestrator’s average CPU load (%).
Profiling of the SO revealed a lightweight application, even
under the load of consequent requests, or in the presence of
two PDP and PIP/PAP instances. The average CPU load and
memory consumption appear in Fig. 5 and Fig. 7 respectively.
As the occupied memory remains constant irrespectively of
the presence of one or two PDPs, the numbers for the second
scenario are omitted. The use of WSS imposes a relatively
small memory overhead, while the average CPU load drops,
as the device has to wait more between requests, due to the
network and processing overhead on other framework entities.
The same behaviour with regard to CPU load was also
recorded on the target device (i.e. the device featuring the
PEP), as is depicted in Fig. 6. As in the case of the SO, intro-
ducing the WSS mechanisms increases the memory footprint
(appearing along with SO values in Fig. 7), but the latter,
along with CPU load, are not significantly affected by the
presence of multiple PDPs and the corresponding PIP/PAPs,
thus the numbers of the second scenario are omitted from the
corresponding figures.
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATIONS
One of the main concerns in accessing services and issuing
commands, is the protection of the data being exchanged
among the participating entities. In the proposed scheme the
service provider has a pre-established relationship with the
SO, PDP and PAP. Note that all these three entities are only
functional components and therefore the exact needs in secure
channel establishment depend on the actual deployment choice
and cannot be specified. In a simplified approach, the SO, PDP
and PAP can be part of the same entity and therefore a secure
channel establishment using pre-shared keys is a viable and
efficient option.
Regarding the underlying message security mechanisms,
there are a number of proposed or standardised schemes that
handle the protection of messages at various layers of the
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Fig. 4. Client-side response time for 100 requests to the Service Orchestrator.
Fig. 6. Target devices CPU load (%) for both scenarios.
network stack. The WS-Security mechanisms adopted by the
authors for the proof of concept implementation is typically
used alongside DPWS, but its public-key security primitives
can impose a significant performance overhead, as is evident
from the performance evaluation presented in the previous
section. Therefore, considering the resource-constrained nature
of some devices, and the need to minimize performance impact
in general, alternative cryptographic primitives can also be
investigated for production environments.
Some prominent alternative schemes protect messages at
the application or network layer and can provide end-to-
end message protection. Well-known security mechanisms for
these layers are the TLS (Transport Layer Security) [40]
protocol and its counterpart proposed for securing UDP mes-
sages, namely DTLS [41]. Other schemes focus on efficiently
providing authenticated encryption, like the Identity-based
Fig. 7. Service Orchestrators and Target device’s memory utilization (in bytes)
for both scenarios.
Cryptosystem (IBC) signcryption mechanisms presented by
Fagen et al. [42]. Related to the above is the relatively
novel concept of security fusion, whereby weak point-to-point
properties are combined in order to produce strong security
properties in a resource-aware manner [43].
At the lower layers, as existing networking mechanisms
are updated and adapted to efficiently handle the vast pop-
ulation of the resource-constrained devices (e.g. work on the
6LoWPAN), the pertinent cryptographic primitives are also
adapted and improved accordingly. Such an example is the
IPsec protocol and its variants that utilize header compression
[44], [45], [46], which can provide similar levels of protection
while preserving the valuable node resources.
It is expected that some of the framework’s entities will
be deployed on normal, relatively powerful nodes (personal
computers or even servers). Thus, e.g. the link between
the Requester and the SO could alternatively be protected
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using common methods, like TLS, the same way that the
communication channel between the Requester and the IdP is
anticipated to be protected, although the latter is outside the
scope of this paper. The cost of using TLS, however, between
the Requester and the SO is that the secure channel breaks at
the SO and the SO has to re-encrypt the communication using
the security parameters set for the link between the SO and
the service provider.
The actual authentication scenario could be further elab-
orated during deployment to match system owner’s specific
requirements and trust relationships with identity providers.
Several options in such a deployment exist as they have been
demonstrated in [47].
The proposed scheme provides the Service Provider the
flexibility to change the orchestrator(s) it uses based on its
needs. This also applies to applicable policy rules which the
service provider can modify to match his/her requirements.
As an example, consider the situation where the owner of
the mobile device being used to offer these services, changes
mobile operator. He/she simply has to change SO, to a
platform operated by the new mobile operator, and register
his/her policies with it. Use of the SO provides additional
benefits which are related to the node’s connectivity. The node
can wake up occasionally to fetch any requests sent to the SO.
This approach also helps save node’s resources, as no requests
are sent to the node unless the latter asks for it. If the service
request was sent directly to the PEP, the corresponding device
would have to always be online, otherwise the service would
be unavailable.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
As computing becomes ubiquitous, adopters aim to exploit
the potential of pervasive systems, including LLN nodes
bearing sensors and actuators, in order to introduce new types
of services and address inveterate and emerging problems,
healthcare being one of the most prominent application. Nev-
ertheless, a key factor in the wide adoption and success of
these new technologies is the effectiveness with which the
various security and privacy concerns are tackled within the
resource-constrained environment.
To this end, this paper proposes an architecture for providing
robust authenticated access control to heterogeneous resource-
constrained devices. The scheme builds upon the standardized
technologies, namely access control mechanisms based on
XACML and SOA-based interfacing of its key entities. In con-
trast to typical XACML deployments, the core PEP functional-
ity and the hosting resource-constrained device are efficiently
relieved from the expensive computations that the XACML
standard defines, without sacrificing any of the policy-based
decision making process. The device is sheltered from direct
user interaction, helping alleviate concerns that are typical to
resource-constrained devices, like DoS attacks. Emphasis was
given on the scheme’s ability to serve users authorized by,
typically, any authentication scheme, thus enabling the large-
scale deployment of the solution to many environments.
An important parameter regarding the efficacy and appli-
cability of such a scheme is the communication mechanism
adopted to implement the interaction between the frameworks
entities. The XACML architecture does not define the exact
communication mechanisms to be used by its entities, but
industry and researchers alike have demonstrated the potential
for significant benefits from the adoption of a SOA-based
approach on the various heterogeneous embedded devices
that permeate smart environments. DPWS is a standardized
specification that enables the bridging of SOAs with resource-
constrained systems, and was thus the technology that the
authors chose for interfacing the various entities that form the
presented framework.
As a proof of concept, the components of the proposed
scheme were developed and deployed on a heterogeneous test-
bed featuring desktop systems and typical embedded devices.
The performance overhead imposed on the three most impor-
tant endpoints, i.e. the client attempting to access the protected
resources, the Service Orchestrator and the PEP, was analyzed
and presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the suggested
solution.
An important aspect to be investigated in future work is
the on adapting and potentially extending XACML policies to
consolidate the requirements introduced in the new IoT reality
(where, e.g. semantics are often utilized to provide context-
awareness [48] and where spatio-temporal factors have to be
considered, due to the constant mobility of users and their
devices [49]) with healthcare requirements, as defined in the
relevant specifications (e.g. [24]). The development of more
lightweight DPWS implementation should also be pursued,
allowing the integration of extremely resource-constrained
devices, like expendable body sensors, into the proposed
framework. This work will have to be carried out concurrently
with the investigation of lightweight cryptographic primitives
appropriate for said devices and the communication mediums
they typically use.
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